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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
E\T..:\. EISNER,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.
SALT LAKE CITY, a Municipal
CorporaJtion,
Defendant, Third-Party
Plaintiff and Respondent,

Case No.

7675

vs.
LEO BONNERU,
Third Party Defendant
and Respondent. /

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT SALT LAKE CITY

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Because we consider Plaintiff's Statement of Facts
altogether too sketchy to give the Court a basis for
passing upon the issues involved in this appeal, we deem
it necessary to make our own Statement of Facts.
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As shown by Exhibit 3, and the oral testimony, the
sidewalk on the south side of 3rd South in Salt Lake
City, running West from West Temple, consists of two
sec;tions or tiers of concrete blocks extending from the
curb south a total of 16 feet, each section being 8 feet
wide. Just west of 125 West 3rd South, where the Fitwell
Artificial Limb Company is located, one block of the
cement in the outer section next to the curb had been
removed, leaving a bare space 6 feet wide east and west,
and 8 feet long north and south, referred to in the evidence as the "gravelly" area or open space. In the fall
of 1948 the City installed a water meter box at the southwest corner of this open space, and Third-Party Defendant LEO BONNERU installed a sewer line across this
space for the building of the Fitwell Artificial Limb
Company. There is no evidence as to who removed the
cement block. But !the cement block was not replaced
and the open space still remained uncovered at the time
of Plaintiff's injury which occurred November 26, 1949.
The surface in this open space had settled so that for
nearly its entire 6 foot width east and west and extending several feet north from the south section of the concrete walk, there was a depression (R. 73). The general
condition is shown by the photographs, Exhibits "E"
and "F", and the penciled outline on Exhibit "3".
Plaintiff lived at 143 West 3rd South, just a short
distance west of this open space. For over a year prior
to the accidenlt she had passed this open space two or
three times a day, and was thoroughly familiar with it.
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She realized it 'vas dangerous, and had said to herself
that so1nebody is going to be hurt there sometime (R. 42,
43). She had no difficulty in seeing the hole as she
passed by. It 'vas perfe0tly visible to any one who might
look at it (R. 54). The accident happened about 10 :30
A.M. while she was returning to her home from Auerbach's
store. The day "~as bright and sunshiny. There was no
snow, and the 'Yalk was dry. As she walked along, there
was no-one in front of her going v.rest. No-one obstructed
the hole or depression (R. 44). The view around the
place where the hole was "\vas entirely unobstructed (R.
68). If she _had looked, there was nothing to prevent
her from seeing the hole as she walked west. As she
approached the hole, she was conscious she was in the
vicinity of it, and she knew she was in the vicinity of the
hole in the sidewalk (R. 44). As she was walking west,
she was walking close to the nol'lth edge of the south
section of concrete blocks so that when she came to the
area where the cement was gone, where the hole was, she
was right close to the edge of the hole (R. 45). She did
not look at the hole at all before she stepped in1to it
(R. 47). When she got within a dozen feet of the hole,
she did not see it (R. 48). She did not look when she
stepped to the side, to the right, when she stepped off the
cemenJt into the hole with her right foot.
At one place in her testimony she testified that she
had gone to a point indicated by a cross on Exhibit "3"
when she first saw some children approaching (R. 47).
This point is about 18 inches west of the east edge of
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the open space. At another place she rtestified she was
at the southeast corner of the open space, shown by the
letter "Z" on Exhibit "3", when she first saw the children (R. 48). In either event, she was right at or opposite ~the hole before she saw the children, so that up to
that point there had been nothing to distract her attention away from the· sidewalk before her. At another place
she testified she moved from point "Z" on Exhibit "3",
the southeast corner of the open space, to where the hole
was and into which she stepped before any person coming
from the west arrived at that point. She saw none of the
children get to her. They were just coming toward her.
When she first saw the children they were about 4 feet
west of her (R. 68, 69).
When she saw the children approaching she stepped
off to the right (R. 47). None of them had reached her
or run into her or touched .her. They were 3 or 4 feet
west of her when she first saw them (R. 49). l!t was
for the first part of the group that she stepped aside.
The children were strung out and not coming abreast
(R. 52). But none of the children had gotten up to the
place where she fell up to the time that she fell (R. 67).
She testified there were 50 to 60 children in the crowd
(R. 29). In her deposition she stated there were 100
(R. 68).

Plaintiff located the hole in which she stepped in
several different places. She made a cross on Exhibit
"E" as lthe place where she stepped off. This mark is not
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in any part of the depression as the n1ark on the exhibit
"ill disclose ( R. :28). She also Inade a cross on Exhibit
~· F~~ to indicate the hole into which she stepped. This
indicates the hole "'"a8 \Yesterly from the east edge of the
open space, probably about 18 inches. This coincides
-writh the cross she placed on Exhibit "3" as being the
place she stepped into the hole (R. 29). However, in her
deposition taken April 1, 1950, she couldn't remember
the place where she fell (R. 50). In her claim filed with
the City, she stated under oath that the hole was about
1 foot to the east of the water meter. So, if the hole was
1 foot east of the water meter, it wouldn't be where she
marked it on Exhibit "E" (R. 58). She later testified
that her memory was clearer when she signed the claim
December 12, 1948, when she stated the hoJe was about
1 foot east of the water meter (R. 66). At one place she
testified, finally, that the hole was over by the water
meter, marked "D" on Exhibit "F" (R. 64).
If Plaintiff stepped off into. the depression at the
point indicated by her cross on Exhibit "F" and Exhibit
"3", she had already gone approximately 18 inches of
the length of the depression. If she stepped off a foot
east of the water meter, she had gone past about 3lf2
feet of the length of the depression before she fell. In
either event, the depression was there, plainly visible
before her, immediately adjacent to where she was walking. There was noithing to distract her attention or preve·nt her from seeing the depression as she approached
and reached it and proceeded to pass along it. She had
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already reached it before she saw the children. She knew
the hole was there; she was conscious that she was in its
vicinity and she knew it was dangerous. No reason is
given for her stepping aside to the right. There is no
evidence the children were occupying the entire walk or
that they in any manner threatened to come in contact
with her. All she says is that "a lot of kids came along
and they were kind of coming toward me, and I stepped
off a little bit off the walk, and that is when I fell." (R.
25).
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
A PERSON IS HELD TO HAVE SEEN THAT WHICH
IS PLAINLY VISIBLE AND OPEN BEFORE HIM.

POINT II.
IT IS THE DUTY OF A PERSON USING A SIDEWALK,
WHERE HE KNOWS A DEFECT EXISTS, TO BE ON THE
LOOKOUT FOR IT.

POINT III.
A PERSON, WHO, IN BROAD DAYLIGHT, STEPS INTO
AN OPEN, PLAINLY VISIBLE DEFECT IN THE SIDEWALK, WITH WHICH HE IS FAMILIAR, IS GUILTY OF
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW.

POINT IV.
TO EXCUSE FAILURE TO SEE AN OPEN, PLAINLY
VISIBLE KNOWN DEFECT, THE PLAINTIFF MUST SHOW
SOME COMPELLING REASON OUTSIDE HERSELF THAT
WOULD JUSTIFY HER FAILURE TO SEE THE DEFECT
IN ORDER TO FREE. HER FROM CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
A PERSON IS HELD TO HAVE SEEN THAT WHICH
IS PLAINLY VISIBLE AND OPEN BEFORE HIM.

The evidence is undisputed that the defect, of which
Plaintiff complains, was an open space six feet wide and
eight feet long. The accident occurred in broad daylight
on a sunshin-y-, clear day. The Plaintiff herself testified
that she had no difficulty in seeing this defect as she
passed by. It was perfectly visible to anyone who might
look at it. Her view of the defect· was entirely unobstructed; there was nothing to prevent her from see·ing
it as she walked west. She was walking along a course
where this defect was directly in front of her. No-one
had distracted her attention up to the time she had
arrived at the defect or was opposite the same!. It was
of such a size and nature that it was plainly visible.
Even a casual glance would have disclosed its presence.
It seems impossible :that a person could have approached
a depression as open and obvious as this without having
seen it as she approached it, if she had paid any atte,ntion
whatsoever to the sidewalk in front of her. We submit
that Plaintiff cannot now be heard to say that she did
not see that which was so plainly visible and obvious
before her. In support of this proposition, we cite the
following authorities.:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Rogers v. Max A.gen, Inc., 340 Pa. 328, 16 A. 2d,
529. Here Plaintiff tripped over a base or shoe by means
of which a bannister was anchored to the floor. The testimony is as follows:

"Q. After you fell you saw that base protruding
out.
A.

The base was there and I saw it after they
picked me up because I wanted to see what
I fell on."

"Q.

Do I understand you to say you didn't see
it before you fell~

A.

Yes, sir, I didn't see it before I fell."

"Q. You didn't look, did you Mrs.
A.
"Q.

A.

"Q.
A.

"Q.
A.

Rogers~

No."
That portion of the bannister railing at the
base on which you put your foot was plainly
visible was it not~ You could see it~ It was
plainly visible to the eye of anybody, including yourself~
S·ure, I could see it."
But you didn't look for it or at it or at that
portion of the floor until after you had fallen~
No sir."
That is

correct~

That is right."

The Court goes on to say :
"Disclosing as it does thoughtless inattention
to her surroundings and a complete failure to be
duly observant of where she was stepping, this
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testllnony leaYes no roo:rn for speculation as to the
sole cause of appellant's injuries. It brings the
case within the rule that 'vhere one is injured as
a result of a failure on his part to observe and
avoid an obvious condition which ordinary care
for his own safety 'vould have disclosed, he will
not be heard to complain."

Jl!ulford v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Company,
310 Pa. 5:21, 165 A. 837. Plaintiff alighted from a streetcar and proceeded a couple of steps from the car when
she stepped into a hole or depression and fell, breaking
her leg. Judgment of non-suit was entered. The Court
says:
"On the record before us, the court below
could not properly have done otherwise than hold
that l\frs. Mulford was, as a matter of law, guilty
of contributory negligence. The accident occurred
about noon on a bright, clear day.. The depression
into which she stepped was six or eight inches
deep, and about the size of a manhole cover. It
was plainly visible·. If she had looked, she could
not have helped seeing the danger, and it is well
settled that one who steps into a defect in a pavement which he could have seen and avoided, had
he looked, cannot recover."

Allshouse v. Borough Wilkinsburg, 343 Pa. 323, 22
A. 2d 756. The Court says :
"On a bright, clear day, about one-thirty in the
afternoon, the Plaintiff tripped over the edge of
a section of concrete sidewalk on North Avenue,
Wilkinsburg, which was raised approximately two
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and one-half inches above the section adjoining it.
There was nothing to conceal the irregularity,
but the Plaintiff testified that he· did not see it
because the two sections of sidewalk were of the
same color and because he was hurrying toward
Pitt Street which he intended to cross and was
part of the time engaged in making observation
of traffic conditions along that Street.
"Under the evidence presented we think the
trial judge was required to enter a compulsory
non-suit. To state the circumstances of the case
is to convict the Plaintiff of contributory negligence. He was bound to see what was plainly
before him and similarity of color of the sections
of the sidewalk and observation of traffic conditions in a highway which he was approaching
could not excuse, him."

City of South Norfolk v. Dahl, 47 S.E. 2d 405, 187
Va. 495. The Court says:
"According to her own testimony, the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a
matter of law. She testified that she stepped in a
hole in the sidewalk which was about 2 feet in
diameter, 2lf2 inches deep, and that in it the concrete had broken in pieces. This occurred in the
daytime when it was not raining, and there was
no obstruction to he~t vision. The hoJe was in her
plain view but she stated that she did not see
it until after she fell- that then she did see it
for the first time.. She gives no excuse for not having seen the hole before she stepped into it. No
conclusion can be drawn from her testimony other
than that she walked blindly into the hole which
she was bound to have seen if she had looked.
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There is no conflict in the evidence on this point
and no roon1 for the deduction of conflicting inferences. The hole was open and obvious to anyone
'valking on the sidewalk in the exercise of ordinary care. This case is controtled by Staunton v.
Kerr, 160 \Ta. 420, 168 S.E. 326."

Rohmann v. City of Richmond Heights, 135 S.W.
2d 378, the Court says:
"No one may he excused from seeing that
which is in plain view and which he could readily
see by the exercise of due care.
"He is not only required to look, but to look
in such an observant manne·r as to enable him
to see the conditions which a person in the exercise of due care and caution for his own safety
and the safety of others would have seen under
like or similar circumstances, and it is as much
negligence to fail to see that which can be observed
by due care as it is negligence not to look at all.
Not to see what is plainly visible where there is
a duty to look constitutes negligence.
"This condition of the backfill was in plain
view. It was broad daylight at the time of the
accident * * * Plaintiff stresses his own testimony
to the effect that he could not see the condition
of the backfill, but saying he could not see what
was in plain view, in broad daylight, is without
probative force. Plaintiff's own testimony shows
him guilty of contributory negligence as a matter
of law."

Seiser v. Redfield, 211 Iowa 1035, 232 N.W. 129.
In this case Plaintiff was injured by stepping into a hole
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at the edge of the paved sidewalk. The hole was in the
form of a triangle, the apex extending into the sidewalk
seven to eight inches, and the length being about thirtythree inches. The Plaintiff testified she did not see
the hole in the sidewalk. In going from the store, she
stepped off the edge at the broken place and was injured.
It was a bright, clear, sunshiny day in April. The Court
held Plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as
a matter of law, saying:
"If, as appears from another portion of the
testimony on behalf of the Plaintiff, she walked
in a Northwesterly direction to a point about
opposite the middle of the west window of Town's
Store, then this broken edge was plainly within
the ordinary range of her view as she passed
from the front door of the store to a point to the
north edge of the sidewalk, and she must have·
walked several feet from the point where she
turned before she stepped off the sidewalk, during which time the broken edge was in plain view
and almost directly in front of her."
The C.ourt cites and relies upon the case of Bender
v. Town of Menden, 124 Iowa 685, 100 N.W. 352. In this
case the Plaintiff stood near the hole in question, talking
to a companion and ~then turned and fell into the hole.
The Plaintiff contended his attention was dive:rted by his
conversation with his companion. The Court said:
"The range of vision is not so limited that
one must look directly at a thlng in order to see
it. Had Plaintiff used his senses either as he
approached the opening, or while standing within
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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18 inch~s of it, he n1ust have seen it, the defect
\Vas in plain sight, and n1ight have been seen by
the Plaintiff had he been using his eyes."
The Court further says:
~'Counsel suggest that it was irnpossible for
plaintiff to approach an opening in a sidewalk
of the size of the one described without se·eing
it, and that, if he did not see it, he was guilty of
negligence in not doing so. This we think must be
so."

Jackson r. City of Jamestown, 33 N.D. 596, 157 N.W.
475, Plaintiff was standing on the sidewalk joshing with
a friend, when he stepped backwards off the sidewalk
into a trench or ditch 1% feet de-ep and 1 foot 4 inches
wide which was about 1 foot away from the sidewalk.
In reversing a judgment for the Plaintiff and directing
the trial court to enter a judgment for the Defendant,
the Court says:
" 'The law will not excuse a traveler in failing
to make such use of his faculties as will enable
him to discover plain and obvious dangers in the
highway or sidewalk in front of him, but if he
heedlessly casts himself upon a plain and obvious
obstruction or into a plain and obvious e·xcavation,
he and not the city must suffer the consequences
of his negligence and folly.' Thompson on Negligence, volume 5, section 6242. 'There is no rule
of law that goes so far as to excuse the traveler
from making such use of his faculties to discover
dangers and protect himself from them as prudent and careful travelers should make.. He can
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not rely so far on the presumption that the municipal authorities have done their duty and have
kept the highway in repair as to go blindly forwa:rd without looking ahead and to take chances
of getting along safely. His failure ~to notice large
holes in the~ highway ahead of him will be imputed
to hirn as contributory negligence, unless his attention has been distracted in some other direction, not idly, but by some sufficient cause.'"

Watkins v. City of Raleigh, 214 N.C. 644, 200 S.E.
424. The Plaintiff, on May 9, 1936, at about 10 :30 a.m.,
fell at a hole in the sidewalk approximately 2Yz feet wide,
3 feet long, and 2 or more. inches deep. She testified she
did not see the hole. The court quotes extensively from
the testimony to show that the hole was plainly visible
and says:
"A person travelling on a street is required in
the exercise of due care to use his faculties to discover and avoid dangerous defects and obstructions, the care required being commensurate
with the danger or appearance thereof. He is
guilty of contributory negligence if by reason of
his failure to exercise such care he fails to discover and avoid a defect which is visible and obvious."

D'Annunzio v. Philadelphia Suburban Water Company, 143 Pa. Super 422, 18 A. 2d 86. The hole involved
he·re was llf2 to 2 feet wide and 2Yz to 3 feet long, and
from 2 to 4 inches deep. The Court says :
"It is true that plaintiff, in describing rthe
happening of the accident, testified that he looked.
But it was not enough for plaintiff to say he was
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looking and did not see the defect. Any exercise
of reasonable diligence "\vould have disclosed the
hole. He was bound to see what was plainly visible. In Graham v. Philadelphia, 19 Pa. Super.
292, at page 295, this court said: 'We recognize the
principle that it is in vain for one to say that he
looked and did not see, when, if he had looked, he
must have seen, and that in such a case it is not
the duty of the Court to submit to the jury the
question 'vhether he looked and failed to see the
danger.' In the present case the hole in the sidewalk was plainly visible and if plaintiff had
looked, he must have seen the danger. Dangers
'vhich are apparent to ordinary observation must
be avoided by those who ap·proach them."

Goodman v. Theatre Parking, Inc., 281 N.W. 545, 286
Mich. 80. Defendant maintained an auto parking lot.
Plaintiff parked his car and stepped out to get money
from his pocket. He stepped on a cinder and sprained
his ankle. He was awarded judgment by the lower court.
On appeal the case was reversed. The Court says.:
"If rthe cinder was as large as claimed by
Plaintiff, it was plainly discernible. Plaintiff
claims that, as he stepped out, the running hoard
of his car -vvould shut off the view of the cinder
had he looked, but this did not relieve him of the
duty of looking where he was about to step, and he
testified he did not look. Ordinary prudence demands that a view be taken of the place where one
is about to step. Plaintiff failed to take such view
and, even if defendant was negligent in permitting the cinder to remain upon the lot, plaintiff's
contributory negligence bars recovery."
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POINT II.
IT IS THE DUTY OF A PERSON USING A SIDEWALK,
WHERE HE KNOWS A DEFECT EXISTS, TO BE ON THE
LOOKOUT FOR IT.

Plaintiff freely admitted that she knew of the existence of the defect complained of. She passed it two or
three times a day for over a year. She was conscious
that it presented a danger. Furthermore, she knew as she
was walking along on the day of the accident that she
was approaching the vicinity of this defect. She had it
in mind and yet did not see it. Under such circumstances,
we submit that it was her duty to keep a lookout for this
defect, and her failure to do so precludes her from recovery.
II Restatement of the Law of Torts, S.ection 474,
page 1248:

"Nevertheless the plaintiff must not only exercise reasonable care to avoid dangers which are
obvious or of which he has knowledge, but he must
be alert to discover the actual condition of the
roadway. * * * Therefore, if the plaintiff would
have obse.rved the dangerous condition in time tto
avoid it, had he been paying that attention, which,
in view of the normal risks of travel, a traveler
should have paid, his contributory negligence in
failing to exercise such reasonable vigilance· is
a bar to his recovery."
In 17 L.R.A., N.S. 198, is the following:
"A traveler, having no notice of danger, need
not keep a special lookout for defects or dangers,
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but n1ay rely upon the presu1nption that the walk
is safe, but, if he has notice of a defect, or has
reason to believe that a defect exists in the sidewalk, it is his duty to be on the lookout for it, and
use reasonable care, commensurate with the known
danger, to avoid an accident therefrom."
This same note further says:
'"If a person knew of a defect in a sidewalk,
and was injured thereby, it is presumed, in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, that he remembered it and was negligent."

Dunn v. Wagner, 22 Cal. App. 2d 51, 70 P. 2d 498.
The defect here involved was a rise in a part of the. sidewalk above the other. Plaintiff testified she was personally familiar with the condition as she had lived in the
neighborhood and had seen the rise on numerous occasions before the accident. The Court held the evidence
was insufficient as a matter of law to support a verdict
for the plaintiff and reversed the judgment, saying:
"Here the defect, if it Wfts a defect, was visible and had existed for a long period of time and
Plaintiff herself knew of its existence, as above
stated, and by the use of ordinary care could have
avoided the accident. It is the duty of a pedestrian
traveling in or crossing a public street of a city to
use ordinary care for his personal safety and to
reasonably exercise the facultjes with which he is
endowed by nature for self protection, and if he
fails to do so and is injured by reason of such failure, he has himself to blame and cannot recover on
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chan tile Co., 34 Cal. Ap·p. 302, 167 P. 287; Kennedy
v. Philadelphia, 220 Pa. 273, 69 A. 748, 17 L.R.A.
( n. s.) 194 ; 13 Cal. J ur. 372, Sec. 60. Where he
knows of 'the danger he must look out for it."
Bodenheimer v. City of New Orleans, ______ La. ______ ,
18 So. 2d 224. Here the depression was 5 feet long, 2·¥2
feet wide, and varying from 1 to 2112 inches in depth.
The accident occurred at 9:30 a.m. The Plaintiff knew
the sidewalk was out of repair. On the point here involved the Court says:
"In cases where the pedestrian concedes that
he knew that the walk was in bad condition, the
reason for the doctrine (presumption that sidewalk is safe) disappears. In such instances, the
care required of him must be commensurate with
his knowledge-and it seems manifest that he cannot excuse his failure to avoid an open danger by
asserting that he was entitled to assume that the
path was safe· for travel. * * * Her prior knowledge
should have placed her on her guard. By the exercise of reasonable care, she 'Could have easily
averted the unfortunate accident."
Matthews v. City of LeGrand, 136 Ore. 426, 2.99 P.
999. The court approved the following instruction:

"Where such pedestrian knows, or by tthe
exercise of ordinary care ought to know, that a
sidewalk is in a dangerous condition, such pedestrian cannot assume that such way is safe, and
must exercise greater caution in passing over such
way."
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O'Neill v. City of St. Louis, 292 Mo. 656, 239 S.W.

94. The Court says :
''Here she knew of the defect and frankly
says that she could have seen it that night had she
been on the lookout. She admits knowledge, and
admits that if at the time of the injury she had
been looking, she could have seen and avoided the
dangerous place which was the occasion of her
injury. In such a case, ordinary care would have
required her to have been upon a lookout for the
dangerous place of which she had knowledge. Her
admitted failure constitutes contributory negligence as a matter of law."

Rinfret v. Clegg, 58 R. I. 478, 193 A. 620. HeTe the
hole was about 3 feet long, 3 feet wide, and 4 to 5 inches
deep. Plaintiff was familiar with its e·xistence. The
Court says:
"In these circumstances, the necessary and
sole inference to be drawn from rthe evidence is
that she stumbled and fell because she was not
looking for the hole as she was bound to do if it
was dangerous and she knew of the danger."

POINT III.
A PERSON, WHO, IN BROAD DAYLIGHT, STEPS INTO
AN OPEN, PLAINLY VISIBLE DEFECT IN THE SIDEWALK, WITH WHICH HE IS FAMILIAR, IS GUILTY OF
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW.

It is clear from the evidence that Plaintiff in broad
daylight stepp·ed into a depression which was open and
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plainly visible and with which she was thoroughly familiar. Under the following authorities she is guilty of
contributory negligence as a matter of law.

Roth v. Vernona Borough, 316 Pa. 279, 175 A. 689.
The Court says :
"The accident occurred at high noon of a
bright, clear .summer day. Plaintiff testified that
she 'knew the sidewalk was rough and uneven, it
really wasn't fit to walk on.' She also testified
she saw the hole that day 'when it was about
twelve feet away.' It was intimated that the hole
might have been concealed from her view by children running around on the pavement, and by a
man who was walking towards her. But she walked
the twelve feet between it and her when she first
saw it, before she and the man met face to face aJt
one side of the hole, and then she stepped sideways
directly into it. The man could not, therefore, at
any time, have interfered with her vision, so far as
t.he hole was concerned; and she was too close to
the hole when she stepped into it for either him
or the children to have interfered with her seeing
it at that time·. It is e:vident she was then giving
no heed to her own safety. When she stepped to
one side and into the hole, she either saw it or she
did not. If she looked she muS't have then seen
it and delliherately or negligently stepped into it,
for she says it was oblong in shape; its longest
diameter eight and three-quarters inches, and its
depth one and a half inches. If she did not look,
then she negleeted her duty in traversing this
pavement, which she knew 'really wasn't fit to
walk on.' In either event she cannot recover."
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Blankenship v. Kansas City, 156· Kan. 607, 135 P.
2d 588. The Court says:
"Here the t-estimony showed plaintiff was
aware of the claimed defect and had avoided use
of the particular crossing because she knew it was
dangerous, yet notwithstanding she proceeded at
her usual gait and usual walk to go straight across
the crossing. It would seem that with full knowledge of the situation and the claimed dangerous
condition with which she was fully familiar, she
not only did not affirmatively act with the care an
ordinary prudent person would have exercised in
the circumstances, but she proceeded in utter disregard as to possible consequences."

Burns v. Mayor of Baltimore, 138 Md. 582, 115 A.
111. The hole involved here was caused by a number of
displaced bricks in the sidewalk. The evidence showed
the plaintiff had seen this hole frequently and knew of
its existence. The Court directed a verdict for the city
because of plaintiff's contributory negligence. This was
affirmed by the appellate court which said :
"In view of the majority of the court, the
long-continued defect in the sidewalk and the full
knowledge of the plaintiff of the condition, and
with nothing to qualify in this regard the testimony of the plaintiff, there was nothing left for
the jury to find upon this point, and the court upon the subject of contributory negligence was correct, and the judgment appealed from must be
affirmed."
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Ryan v. Foster, 137 Iowa 737, 115 N.W. 595. Plaintiff stumbled over a billboard which had fallen on the
sidewalk in the process of being taken down. The Court
says:
"We think the record conclusively establishes
plaintiff's contributory negligence. The section of
the billlboard was in plain sight. There was a
4 x 4 nailed to the boards extending up on the
sidewalk. It had been snowing, and the ground
was white. The billboard had no snow upon it and
was plainly visible. Indeed, the most casual glance
would disclose its presence and location. Plaintiff's attention was in no manner diverted and, had
she used her eyes, she could not have failed to see
it. She eithe-r did see it, or was negligent in not
seeing it. If she saw it, and attempted to pass over
it, she was negligent; and if she did not see it, as
she says, then she was clearly negligent."

King v. Colon Tp. 125 Mich. 511, 84 N.W. 1077. The
Court says:
"It would be a dangerous doctrine that one
injured on the public highway in broad daylight
may excuse himself by saying: 'It is true that I
knew of the dangerous place ; that I was in close
proximity to it; that I might have seen it had I
looked. But I did not think of it, and therefore did
not look.' I find no case that lays down such a rule
of law."
POINT IV.
TO EXCUSE FAILURE TO SEE AN OPEN, PLAINLY
VISIBLE KNOWN DEFECT, THE PLAINTIFF MUST SHOW
SOME COMPELLING REASON OUTSIDE HERSELF THAT
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WOULD JUSTIFY HER F AlLURE TO SEE THE DEFECT
IN ORDER TO FREE HER FROM CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.

It should be re1nembered that Plaintiff had reached
the defect of which she complains before her attention
was in any manner attracted to the children approaching. She testified that she had reached either the Southeast corner of the open space or a point opposite the
place where she fell, whichever version of her testimony
referred to in the Statement of Facts is adopted, before
she saw the children. The sidewalk before her was entirely unobstructed and open. There was nothing rto prevent her from seeing the open space as she approached
it. There is no testimony as to any conduct on the part
of the children that would create any emotion in the
Plaintiff that would distract her attention. All that ap·pears is that the children were coming toward her, which
is a common everyday experience which anyone using
a public sidewalk would encounter. If she had been keeping any kind of a reasonable lookout, she would have seen
the open space as she approached it and as she reached it,
and up to that time there wasn't a thing to distracrt her
attention as she had not then seen the children. The
paved sidewalk on which she was walking was eight feet
wide, which would furnish ample room for ordinary passage. There is nothing to show that the children occupied
the whole of this eight-foot walk or that it was necessary
for the Plaintiff to step to one side. She does not testify
as to what rthe children were doing or that she sensed
any danger in their approach, or anything about the
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children that would cause her to divert her attention
from the sidewalk to them. We submit that the Plaintiff
has not shown such a compelling reason outside of herself that would excuse her from seeing what was obvious
and open for her to see and to justify her failure to see
where she was stepping.

Lerner v. ~hiladelphia, 221 Pa. 294, 70 A. 755, 21
L.R.A., N.S. 614; the accident here occurred at 4 :00
o'clock p.m. in April. The defect consisted of the displacement of some bricks in the sidewalk causing a depression into which plaintiff stepped and fell. The Court
held the plaintiff was not entitled to recovery, saying:
"When the· accident occurs in broad daylight,
in consequence of an open and exposed defect in
the sidewalk, the burden res'ts upon the party complaining to show conditions outside of himself
which prevented him seeing the defect, or which
would excuse his failure to observe it. If such
conditions exist, there is excuse for walking by
faith. When they do not e:xist, the law charges
the· party with failure to do what was re:quired
of him.''

Bodenheimer v. City of New Orleans, 18 S. 2d 224.
We have already cited this case in our brief. The plaintiff kne\v the sidewalk was out of repair. She saw a lady
across the street with a small dog. Being interested in
the dog, she crossed over and stood talking to the owner.
When she turned rto leave, she stepped into the depression. The Court held she was not entitled to recover,
saYing:
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"'The defect, as we have said, was perfectly
obvious, and a casual glance by J\1rs. Bodenheimer
"~ould haYe immediately advised her of the dangerous place at ":hich she was standing. But her
attention "~as so completely diverted by her interest in the pet dog of Mrs. Martinez that she
apparently forgot all about the danger. It is true
that she explains in her testilnony that she did
not know the existence of the particular defect
which caused her injury, but that she, in common
'vith other residents of the neighborhood, was
cognizant that the general condition of the sidewalk was bad. However, the fact that she did not
know of the particular defect should have
prompted her to exert greate-r caution as she was
well aware of the general unsound condition of
the walk."

Grubman v. City of New York, 25 NYS 2d 757. Here
the Plaintiff claims the heel of her shoe was caught in a
broken sidewalk, of which she knew, after she stepped
back a couple of steps on seeing a dog approaching her
dog. The accident happened at 10:00 a.m. July 14, 1940.
Defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint was granted.
The Court says:
"Briefly, the court finds that the time of the
accident was 10:00 o'clock in the morning in broad
daylight; the piaintiff resided in the neighborhood
for 20 years; she knew of the particular defective
condition; she took several steps backwards which
caused her heel to catch in the broken sidewalk,
throwing her to the ground. It is apparent that
plaintiff's own want of caution and ordinary care
contributed in part to the accident and prevents
her recovery."
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Roth v. V ernona Burrough, 316 Pa. 279, 175 A. 689.
We have already quoted from this case under Point III.
Upon the point here involved, we desire to call the Court's
attention to the fact that there were children running
around on the pavement and a man was approaching the
plaintiff and met her face to face at one side of the hole.
The Court points out that neither the _man nor the children interfered with her seeing the hole as she. got close
to it and stepped into it. This case presents identically
the same facts as the instant case and holds that plaintiff's negligence prevented her from recovery.
Devine v. Sampler Bros. Co., 362 Pa. 164, 66 A. 2d
779. Plaintiff was walking with her daughter and grandson on an avenue on August 21, 1.946 at 2 :00 p.m. The
defendant was making repairs and excavating part of
the sidewalk in front of its premises near the curb. As
plaintiff approached the intersection the stree~t was
crowded with people. Several buses were loading and
discharging passengers. Plaintiff stepped to the right
to avoid them, was caught in part of the excavation on
the sidewalk, and throiWll to the ground, suffering injury.
The Defendant contended that the. plaintiff was guilty of
contributory negligence as a matter of law in stepping
into an unguarded despression which was plainly visible.
The trial court accepted this view, saying:
"It was ~the obligation of the plaintiff who
stepped into a depression in the sidewalk in full
daylight to produce evidence showing that she was
prevented from seeing danger or excusing her
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failure to observe it. It is the duty of a pedestrian
to look as she or he walks and to see that which
is to be seen and if one looks."
The appellate court affirms the language above
quoted and cites and relies upon Lerner v. City of Philadelphia, supra.

White v. City of Harrisburg, 20 A. 2d 751. Plaintiff
was crossing Pine Street. A three-foot strip of macadam
had been placed over the wood block bed of the street
parallel to the curb and was 31f2 inches higher than the
bed. Plaintiff stumbled over this rise and sought to excuse failure to see it by saying: "I was not looking down
at all. I was watching the traffic." The Court held she
was guilty of contributory negligence and could not recover.
Foster v. Burrough of Westview, 195 A. 82 328 Pa.
368. Here plaintiff and her companion were walking on
the sidewalk. As they approached close to the private
entrance walk to 444 Perrysville Avenue a child approached the sidewalk from the house. As plaintiff and
her companion were occupying the full width of the concrete sidewalk, plaintiff, in order to make room for the
child, stepped from the paved to the unpaved portion
between the p·aved walk and rthe curb and fell. There
was an inequality of several inches between the concrete
walk and the unpaved ground. Plaintiff was familiar
with the condition. The Court held that the unpaved
strip of land was clearly visible and that she could nort
recover.
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City of Birmingham v. Edwards, 201 Ala. 251, 77
So. 841. The Court says:
"If plaintiff knew of the defect in the sidewalk, then conrt.ributory negligence on her part in
not remembering and avoiding the danger is to be
presumed in the absence of satisfactory excuse
for forgetting. This rule merely places upon the
pedestrian, after it appears that he well knew of
the defective condition of the sidewalk, and its
attending danger, the burden of offering testimony to excuse his forgetfulness or inattention."

Reynolds v. Los Angeles Gas & E. Company, 162 Cal.
327, 122 P. 962. The Court held the plaintiff was barred
from recovering as a matter of law by her contributory
negligence, saying:
"That momentary forgetfulness of a depression, which forgetfulness is not induced by some
sudden and adequate disturbing cause, is itself
as a matter of law contributory negligence barring
recovery."

Davis v. Cal. Stree.t Cable Railroad Company, 105
Cal. 131, 38 P. 647. Defendant had placed an iron rail
to be used in the construction of its street railway track
in front of the home in which Plaintiff lived. It had remained there for about four weeks. A fire alarm sounded
in the night, and plaintiff came out of her house and
started across the sidewalk to discover the whereabouts
of the fire. S·he forgot the presence of the rail, tripped,
fell, and was injured. The Court held that plaintiff would
have been excused from remembering the rail if her house
had been falling and goes on to say:
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"But that is not this case. No danger could
have been apprehended by Mrs. Davis from the
fire after she reached the sidewalk, but mere
curiosity induced her to start to go down the street
to see where the fire was. That she forgot the
presence of the rail is not disputed in the evidence, but that the circumstances justified her
forgetfulness and consequent want of care cannot
be conceded."
She was held to be guilty of contributory negligence as a
matter of law.

Hill v. Richmond, 189 Va. 576, 53 S.E. 2d 810. Plaintiff fell by slipping on a depression in the sidewalk four
inches deep in the center and sloping gradually from the
circumference with a diameter of 4% feet. It was snowing and the depression was somewhat obscured by the
snow. Plaintiff had lived in the vicinity eight years, knew
of the depression, walked by it many times. The court
held she was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter
of law.

City of Winchester v. Carroll, 99 Va. 727, 40 S.E.
37. Here the sidewalk was three feet higher than the
surface of the street with no barriers or guard rails.
Plaintiff had passed by it and over it frequently. On the
night in question, she walked up the steps at the end of
the sidewalk to go to commencement exercises. When she
came out the sidewalk was crowded and, forgetting the
difference in elevation, she stepped from it into the street
and was injured. The court held she was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
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Hupfe,r v. City of North Platte, 134 Neb. 585, 279
N.W. 68. Plaintiff, in broad daylight, was walking along
the sidewalk, watching a parade. She stepped into a de-pression in the sidewalk two to five inches deep and fell.
The Court held the plaintiff was guilty of contributory
negligence as a matter of law.
Fleming v. City of Rockford, 303 Ill. App. 224, 25

N.E. 2d 128. The decision is contained in the headnote
which reads as follows:

"A pedestrian who could have seen hole in
sidewalk and could have avoided it if she had
looked, but who heedlessly proceeded along sidewalk without looking, proximately contributed to
her own injury, and could not recover therefor
from city notwithstanding that her thoughts immediately prior to fall were for safety of baby
which her daughter was pushing at her side in
baby cab and toward which an automobile was
being pushed."
Rinfret v. Clegg, 58 R. I. 478, 193 A. 620. The plaintiff was waJlking with her sister on one side and a gentleman friend on the other, intending to go to the beach
to join in a celebration the night before the 4th of July.
The street was more or less crowded and a spirit of festivity prevailed. Plaintiff testified that she was talking
with her companions when she suddenly fell on her face .
There was a hole in the sidewalk three feet long, three
feet wide, and four or five inches deep. She was familiar
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with this defect and had walked around it on other occasions. The Court held she was guilty of contributory
negligence as a matter of law, saying:

''A person using a sidewalk which he knows
is in a defective condition, who is not confronted
with any sudden occurrence or emergency, is
bound to exercise that degree of watchfulness
and caution that a person of ordinary prudence
would exercise under like circumstances.
"There is no evidence in the instant case that,
at the time of the accident, the plaintiff's attention
was diverted by any sudden occurrence, or that
there was any emergency which made it ne.cessary
for her to walk over a dangerous p'lace in the
sidewalk that she had avoided for some twentyone or twenty-two years and had never 'stepped
on it before that night.'"

D'Annunzio v. Philadelphia Suburban Water Company, 143 Pa. Super. 422, 18 A. 2d 86. We have heretofore cited this case under Point II. We quote in addition
the following:
"When, in broad daylight, one walks into an
obvious and exposed defect in a sidewalk, a presumption of contributory negligence arises, and
the plaintiff is obliged to show conditions outside
himself which prevented him from seeing the defect, or which would excuse his failure to notice
it. Bean v. City of Philadelphia, 260 Pa. 278, 280,
103 A. 727; Klein v. City of Pittsburgh, 97 Pa.
Super. 56, 61; Walker v. Stern, 132 Pa. Super
343, 346, 200 A. 897. In the present case the hole
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in the sidewalk was plainly visibie, and if plaintiff had looked he must have seen the danger.
Dangers which are apparent to ordinary observation must be avoided by those who approach them.
'The law exacts reasonable care of those who use
public footways and if the user fails to notice an
obvious danger he is negligent as a matter of
law.'"
PLAINTIFF'S AUTHORITIES DO NOT
WARRANT A REVERSAL
We have read all the cases cited by Plaintiff in her
brief. We respectfully submit that they do not entitle
her to a reversal in this case. We shall state our reasons
for this assertion.

Sm.ith v. City of Tacoma, 163 Wash. 626, 1 P. 2d
870. In this case the boards of a wooden walk had buckled
in several places, causing raises in the boards. Plaintiff
thought she had passed all the raises. It appears, therefore, that she was apparently watchful for the defects
and assumed that she was beyond them. Such a state of
facts is entirely different from the instant case. The
Court makes the significant statement, also, that the
cases cited by the City sustain its position for non-suit
on the ground of contributory negligence, but the Court
refused to follow them.
Denton v. City of Twin Falls, 54 Idaho 35, 28 P. 2d
202. Here plaintiff testified his attention was distracted
by a boy who "yelled out and it kind of startled me and
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I looked around to see what 'vas going on, and the next
thing I knew I 'Yas getting up. Just when he let out his
yell, then is when I fell." There is no such sudden or
disturbing element in the instant case.

Cox 'V. City of Coffeyville, 153 Kan. 392, 110 P. 2d
77'2. In this case Moore, carrying groceries, came upon
the plaintiff suddenly from around the corner of a buildIng. The Court says:
"The meeting with Moore was so sudden
plaintiff could not allege whether Moore actually
brushed plaintiff and pushed him into the hole, or
whether plaintiff stepped aside to avoid a collision and fell into the hole."
There is no such sudden emergency involved in the instant case.
The cases cited from 13 A.L.R. 87 all involved icy
condition of the sidewalk. In the New York case the
place seemed dangerous a few days before, and, at the
time of his fall, plaintiff's attention was diverted by a
crowd. Where the defective condition was due to ice, it
is clear that the condition would change from day to day.
In the Missouri case the plaintiff slipped as he stepped
aside to let a person pass, which might happen if the
plaintiff were ever so careful and was conscious of the
slippery condition. In the Wisconsin case the snow concealed the outline of the hummock of ice so that plaintiff
did not see it, when he was accosted by a friend while
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walking along in a snow storm. The note also cites
Chicago v. McDonald, 111 rn. App. 436, where a woman
who was passing along the street and noticed an attraction in the window of a dry goods store turned to go to
the store and did not see a strip of ice over which she
crossed, and fell upon it and was injured. It was held
she was guilty of such contributory negligence as to bar
her recovery.

Mullins v. City of Butte, 93 Mont. 601, 20 P. 2d 626.
There was no evidence in this case that the defect, a loose
block, was yisible. Plaintiff thought she heard her fiveyear old son crying as she neared her home and started
rto run to get to it. There was no such distracting element
in the instant case. The Court held that the mere knowledge of the defect alone wa.s not sufficient.
In Hughey v. Fergus County, 98 Mont. 98, 37 P. 2d,
1035, the Court states the rule to be that mere knowledge
of the· existence of the offending instrumentality where
the injury is suffered does not raise the legal presumption of negligence unless "it further appears that plaintiff had .reason to apprehend danger." The Court says:
"This court has declared that 'every person is
bound to an absolute duty to exercise his intelligence to discover and avoid dangers that may
threaten him. When, therefore, a plaintiff asserts
the right of recovery on the ground of culpable
negligence of the defendant, he is bound to show
rthat he exercised his intelligence to discover and
avoid the danger, which he alleges wa.s brought
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about by the negligence of the defendant' ( Sherris
v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 55 Mont. 189, 175 P.
269, 271), and 'when the circumstances attending
the injury, as detailed by the plaintiff's evidence,
raise a presumption that he was not, at the time,
in the exercise of due care, he has failed to make
out a case for the jury. The burden is then upon
him, and if he fails to introduce other evidence
to remove this presumtion, he is properly nonsuited.' (George v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 59
Mont. 162, 196 P. 869, 870.)"

In the instant case Plaintiff was well aware not only of
the existence of the depression, but that it was dangerous.
Barry v. Terkildsen, 72 Cal. 254, 13 P. 657. In this
case the plaintiff "never knew before that the hole was
there." So she had a right to assume the sidewalk was in
safe condition and was not negligent in being momentarily attracted to some children playing on the street.
No such assumption is available to a plaintiff who knows
that the sidewalk is out of repair and dangerous.
Van Praag v. Gale, 107 Cal. 438, 40 P. 5·55. Here the
defendant had a basement well in the sidewalk which
gave access to the basement. Plaintiff, who had a store
next door, went past the well which then was covered
and talked to a jeweler three to five minutes. While plaintiff was talking to the jeweler, the ashman came and
opened the trap door, but plaintiff did not know the door
was open. When he returned, he was looking at some
figures he had received from the jeweler and feU into
the opening.
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DuVal v. Boos Bros. Cafete.ria Co., 45 Cal. App. 377,
187 P. 767. Plaintiff was injured when she fell into a
sidewalk well leading into the defendant's basement.
When ten or twelve feet from the trap doors, she saw
they were closed. Her attention was attracted to sometiring she was passing. She turned her head and as she
walked that short distance, one of the doors was raised
directly in her pathway and she fell.
We submit that neither of these two California
cases are in anywise in point to sustain plaintiff's position here.

Wolverton v. Village of Saranac, 171 Mich. 419, 137
N.W. 211. Here there were ten holes of varying sizes with
which plaintiff was more or less familiar. When she approached them, she slackened her pace and passed over
several safely. While attempting to avoid one of the
larger holes, she stepped into one of the smaller ones
and either slipped or stumbled. It appears, therefore,
that plaintiff was consciously trying to avoid the defects,
and under such circumstances it woruld be a question for
the jury to determine whether she was quiity of contributory negligence. Such a case is entirely different from the
instant case where plaintiff did not see the defect and
was not attempting to avoid it.
Carton v. City of Philadelphia, 142 Pa. Super. 381,
22 A. 2d 603. Here the· plaintiff was walking beside her
daughter who was pushing a baby carriage. Steps can1e
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out fron1 a building and narro,ved the sidewalk, so plaintiff stepped behind her daughter until they had passed
the steps. Then she stepped forward to get alongside her
daughter. ..A.s she did so, she stepped into a hole in the
sidewalk. The carriage had passed over the hole, and
this, together 'vith the position of ~the parties, prevented
plaintiff from seeing the defect, which was three inches
'vide, five inches long and three inches deep. There is no
evidence that she knew of this defect nor any special
reason for her to anticipate a danger of the character
encountered.

CONCLUSION
We submit there is no other conclusion possible in
this case than that the negligent inattention of the Plaintiff, herself, contributed to the happening of the unfortunate occurrence. By law she was bound, not only
to keep a reasonable lookout as she proceeded along the
walk, as are all pedestrians, and thus avoid obvious and
patent defects, but, since she knew of the defect and
was conscious of its presence and its danger, she was
held to a higher degree of care. She was required to
keep a lookout for the defect. This she did not do.
Furthermore, the defect being of the size it was, perfectly
visible and such that one who looked ahead with seeing
eyes couid nort help but see, it being broad daylight, and
nothing to obstruct her view, we submit that her failure
to see the defect and act accordingly can only be ascribed
to her inatten'tion and lack of reasonable care.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The meeting of people on the sidewalk is an everyday occurrence. There is nothing in the evidence that
would warrant any inference that Plaintiff's meeting the
children was any different than ordinarily occurs. While
she states there were fifty or sixty, they were strung
out, and there is no evidence as to the number in the
vanguard approaching the Plain'tiff or what they were
doing, or how much of the paved walk they occupied.
Nor is there any evidence to shorw there was any need
for Plaintiff to step aside nor any excuse for he·r failure
to look as she so stepped, knowing as she did that she
was in the vicinity of this defect and that the same ap-.
peared dangerous to he·r.
There is no dispute as to the facts. The question of
her contributory negligence appears as a matter of iaw.
It was the trial court's clear duty to grant the dismissal,
and that judgment of dismissal should be sustained.
Respectfully submitted,
E. R. CHRIS.TENSEN,
City Attorney
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